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UNDERLYING CONTRADICTIONS IN THE
SUPREME COURT'S CLASSIFICATION
OF DEFAMATION
GEORGE C. CHRISTIE*
The Supreme Court continues to spin a web in which the standard
of proof of liability in defamation cases depends on the characteriza-
tion of the plaintiff as either a public official or a public figure on the
one hand or a private person on the other. To many this distinction,
particularly as developed in later cases, seems unwise. The purpose of
this article, however, is not to attack directly this distinction and the
fluctuating standards of proof to which it has led. It is to show that the
theoretical basis for the distinction has been undermined by the Court
during the very same period it has been creating the public
figure/private person dichotomy.
The web created by the Court's decisions entangles both plaintiffs
and defendants in search of constitutional protection. It is submitted
that the need for consistency between the cases construing the first
amendment in other contexts and the cases establishing standards of
proof in defamation actions will force the Court to reconsider the path
it has taken.
I. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief Recapitulation of Gertz and Its Background.
Seven years have elapsed since the Court, in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.,' put a halt to the seemingly constantly expanding scope of New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan.2 In Sullivan the Court had held that, in
order to recover for defamation, a plaintiff had to prove actual malice3
on the part of the defendant. Sullivan had involved a plaintiff who was
a prominent local public official, but in a well-known sequence of
cases, the Court applied Sullivan's elevated standard of proof to defa-
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1. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3. In this context, actual malice means knowledge of falsehood, or recklessness in the sense
of conscious indifference to truth.
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mation actions brought by lower-ranking public officials or former
public officials-at least when the actions were based on statements
about their official conduct.4 The Sullivan requirement was then ex-
tended to "public figures," even those who were not involved in poli-
tics.5 Indeed, in one privacy case, Time, Inc. v. Hill,6 the Court
indicated that a relatively unknown person could, by accidental in-
volvement in an event of major newsworthiness, become a public
figure, at least with regard to statements concerning the newsworthy
event. Finally, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. ,7 the Court applied
the Sullivan standard in an action brought by a person who was un-
known to the public but who had become involved in a minor news-
worthy event; specifically, he had been arrested for selling allegedly
obscene literature. There was no majority opinion, but Justice Bren-
nan's plurality opinion seemed to presage the future: discussion of
newsworthy events was to be constitutionally protected; and, at least
when the defendant was a member of the news media, the Court would
be reluctant to second-guess the defendant's conclusion about what was
newsworthy.
Gertz ended this expansionary development, although the Court's
opinion reaffirmed the applicability of the Sullivan requirement of ac-
tual malice in actions brought by public officials and public figures. In
actions brought by so-called private figures, only some showing of fault
was necessary.8 In these cases, however, a plaintiff could recover only
actual damages unless he could satisfy the actual malice requirement of
Sullivan.9 The Court held that Elmer Gertz was not a public figure
even though he was a moderately well-known lawyer who at one time
had been actively involved in the National Lawyers Guild and had oc-
casionally participated in matters of some political importance in
Chicago.' 0
Almost two years later, in Time, Inc. v. Firestone," the Court,
again taking a restrictive view of who is a public figure, held that the
wife of "the scion of one of America's wealthier industrial families"' 2
was not a public figure in the context of an action she had brought for
4. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
5. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1967).
6. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
7. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
8. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
9. Id. at 349.
10. Id. at 324, 351-52.
11. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
12. Id. at 450.
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separate maintenance; in which her husband had counterclaimed for
divorce; and in which each had charged the other with adultery.
B. The Response of the States.
Although in a very important sense Gertz eased the restrictions
that Sullivan had placed on a plaintiff in a defamation action, Gertz
also increased the plaintiffs burden in cases that were never thought to
be governed by Sullivan. It did so by requiring a showing of fault in all
defamation actions and by limiting a plaintiff to his actual damages-
however these may be determined-unless he could show malice on the
part of the defendant. In the absence of such a showing of malice,
neither presumed nor punitive damages could be awarded.' 3
Justice Powell, who wrote for the Court in Gertz, worded his opin-
ion in terms of actions against a "publisher or broadcaster."'14 It was
thus possible to argue that, at least in actions by private persons against
non-media defendants, the common law of defamation survived. A
few state courts did in fact so hold and permitted an action to proceed
without any proof of fault on the issue of truth or falsity on the part of
the defendant. 15 Most state courts that have considered the question,16
as well as the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 17 have concluded that no
such distinction is possible. Plaintiffs in all defamation actions must
show some degree of fault on the part of the defendant. The only ques-
tion is, how much? Most state courts have accepted the distinction
drawn in Gertz between public officials and public figures on the one
hand and private persons on the other.' 8 Others have refused to join
13. 418 U.S. at 349.
14. Id. at 340.
15. E.g., Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 279 Or. 361, 364-71, 568 P.2d 1359,
1362-65 (1977); see, e.g., Rowe v. Metz, 195 Colo. 424, 425-26, 579 P.2d 83, 84-85 (1978); Calero v.
Del Chem. Corp., 68 Wis. 2d 487, 499-506, 228 N.W.2d 737, 744-48 (1975).
16. See, e.g., Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 590-94, 350 A.2d 688, 694-96 (1976);
Ryder Truck Rentals v. Latham, 593 S.W.2d 334, 340 (rex. Civ. App. 1980). See also Gray v.
Allison Div., General Motors Corp., 52 Ohio App. 2d 348, 358, 370 N.E.2d 747, 754 (1977).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs §§ 558, 580B, Comment e (1977).
18. See, e.g., Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 114 Ariz. 309, 312, 560 P.2d 1216, 1219-22
(1977); Dodrill v. Arkansas Democrat Co., 265 Ark. 628, 634, 590 S.W.2d 840, 842 (1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1076 (1980); Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56 Hawaii 522, 531, 543
P.2d 1356, 1363 (1975); Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184, 190, 340 N.E.2d 292, 296 (1975); Gobin v.
Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 230, 531 P.2d 76, 82 (1975); Forrest v. Lynch, 347 So. 2d
1255, 1258 (La. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 971 (1978); Metromedia, Inc. v. Hillman, 285
Md. 161, 165-66, 400 A.2d 1117, 1120 (1979); Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass.
849, 854, 330 N.E.2d 161, 164 (1975); Madison v. Yunker, 589 P.2d 126, 130 (Mont. 1978); Thomas
H. Maloney & Sons v. E.W. Scripps Co., 43 Ohio App. 2d 105, 109, 334 N.E.2d 494, 498 (1974),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 883 (1975); Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85, 88 (Okla. 1976);
Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tenn. 1978); Foster v. Laredo Newspa-
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the Court in its retreat from .Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 19 Perhaps
exhibiting greater sensitivity to the constitutional interests involved,
these states have continued to require a showing of malice, at least
when the defamatory statement concerns an issue of public interest.20
New York has adopted an intermediate position. In Chapadeau v.
Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc. ,21 a case reminiscent of Rosenbloom, the
New York Court of Appeals held that when a private individual is de-
famed in an article whose
content ... is arguably within the sphere of legitimate public con-
cern, which is reasonably related to matters warranting public expo-
sition ... [the plaintiff] must establish, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the publisher acted in a grossly irresponsible manner
without due consideration for the standards of information gathering
and dissemination ordinarily followed by responsible parties.22
The plaintiff in Chapadeau was a high school teacher who had been
arrested for possession of heroin and a hypodermic syringe. The de-
fendant newspaper had incorrectly reported that the plaintiff had been
arrested with two other persons during a party in a public park at
which drugs and beer had been found. Holding that a teacher's influ-
ence with children made the arrest a matter of public interest, the court
of appeals affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the action. 23
The Chapadeau standard is reminiscent of Justice Harlan's sugges-
tion, in his combined opinion in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts2 4 and
Associated Press v. Walker,25 that public figures who were not public
officials might be able to prevail if they could show gross negligence
rather than malice.26 The grossly irresponsible standard has been ap-
plied by lower New York courts in cases involving a landlord who
complained of a television story about a dispute between himself and a
pers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 811 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977); Taskett v. King
Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 441, 546 P.2d 81, 83 (1976).
19. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
20. See, e.g., Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 98-99, 538 P.2d 450, 457,
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975); Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publica-
tions, Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671, 673, 321 N.E.2d 580, 583 (1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976);
Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 82 Mich. App. 153, 163, 266 N.W.2d 693, 698-99 (1978); Schae-
fer v. State Bar, 77 Wis. 2d 120, 125, 252 N.W.2d 343, 346 (1977). See also Gay v. Willinms, 486
F. Supp. 12 (D. Alaska 1979).
21. 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975).
22. Id at 199, 341 N.E.2d at 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
23. Id at 200, 341 N.E.2d at 571-72, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 64-65.
24. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
25. 398 U.S. 130 (1967) (reported sub nom. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts).
26. 388 U.S. at 146-55. Justice Harlan, however, later abandoned that position in Rosen-
bloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 68-69 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting)(arguing for a reason-
able care standard); cf. id at 72-78 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (actual malice required for award of
punitive damages).
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tenant;27 a doctor who brought an action after CBS-TV aired an inter-
view with a former patient who had been treated with amphetamines; 28
and an action against a newspaper that incorrectly reported the disposi-
tion of criminal proceedings brought against a major shareholder of a
shopping mall who had been involved in an altercation with a bicyclist
in the mall.29
C. The Supreme Court's Development of Defamation Post-Gertz.
Although some state courts have determined that the dichotomy
between public officials and public figures on the one hand and private
figures on the other must, in some circumstances, give way to the public
interest in free discussion, the Court thus far seems unwilling to return
to Rosenbloom's newsworthiness test. Indeed, the Court has given
every indication of wanting to permit the maximum number of defa-
mation cases to proceed under the Gertz negligence standard by re-
stricting the class of public figures. One case I have already referred to
is Time, Inc. v. Firestone, decided in 1976.30 In the spring of 1979, the
Court decided Hutchinson v. Proxmire3' and Woston v. Readers Digest
Association.32 Hutchinson involved a professor whose work on the
emotional behavior of animals had been funded by the federal govern-
ment. Some of this research involved the study of behavior patterns
such as the clenching of jaws when the animals were exposed to certain
stressful stimuli. Senator Proxmire sharply criticized the government
funding of this research and awarded Hutchinson the "Golden Fleece
Award." The Court ruled that Hutchinson was a private figure; the
public's interest in the expenditure of government funds did not cause
Hutchinson to be a public figure.33
Woston involved the nephew of Myra and Jack Noble, who were
arrested in 1959 on charges of spying for the Soviet Union and who
later pleaded guilty to charges of espionage. After the Nobles's arrest,
Wolston was questioned by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
and was summoned before several grand juries. Having failed to ap-
pear before a grand jury in July of 1958, Wolston was held in con-
tempt; given a suspended sentence; and placed on three year's
probation conditioned on his cooperation with grand jury investiga-
27. Cottom v. Meredith Corp., 65 A.D.2d 165, 411 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1978).
28. Greenberg v. CBS, Inc., 69 A.D.2d 693, 419 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1979).
29. Grobe v. Three Village Herald, 69 A.D.2d 175, 420 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1979), a 'd, 49 N.Y.2d
932, 406 N.E.2d 491, 428 N.Y.S.2d 676 (1980).
30. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). See text accompanying notes 11-12 supra.
31. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
32. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
33. 443 U.S. at 135-36.
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tions of Soviet espionage. A number of newspapers reported these
events. Although Wolston was identified as a Soviet agent in an FBI
report in 1960, he was never prosecuted. Aside from the investigation
in the late 1950s, Wolston had led a life of obscurity. In 1974, the de-
fendant published a book entitled KGB that named Wolston, among
others, as a person who had been identified as a Soviet agent in the
United States. Wolston then brought the defamation action. The dis-
trict court classified Wolston as a public figure and granted summary
judgment for Readers Digest.34 The court of appeals affirmed.35 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that Wolston was a private figure:
Petitioner's failure to appear before the grand jury and citation for
contempt no doubt were "newsworthy," but the simple fact that these
events attracted media attention also is not conclusive of the public-
figure issue. A private individual is not automatically transformed
into a public figure just by becoming involved in or associated with a
matter that attracts public attention. To accept such reasoning would
in effect re-establish the doctrine advanced by the plurality opinion
in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. .... 36
Although the Court was not prepared to state that one could never in-
voluntarily become a public figure and thereby be subject to the appli-
cation of Sullivan, it certainly showed a strong predeliction against
finding such a situation to exist.
H. THE CoNTRADIcrioN
A. The Old Dominion Case.
On the same day that the Court decided Gertz, it handed down its
decision in Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Association of Let-
ter Carriers v. Austin.37 In that case the three plaintiff letter carriers,
who were among a group of fifteen out of 435 who were not members
of the local branch of the defendant union, were described as "scabs"
in the union newsletter and then likened to Esau, Judas, and Benedict
Arnold. The newsletter continued by quoting Jack London's definition
of a "scab" as "'a traitor to his God, his country, his family and his
class.' "38 The plaintiffs had recovered substantial damages for defa-
mation in the trial courts, and the Virginia Supreme Court had
affirmed. 39
34. 429 F.Supp. 167, 176, 180 (D.D.C. 1977), af§'d, 578 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd, 443
U.S. 157 (1979).
35. 578 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd, 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
36. 443 U.S. at 167.
37. 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
38. Id at 268 (emphasis in original).
39. 213 Va. 377, 192 S.E.2d 737 (1972), rev'd, 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
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On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. Writing through Justice
Marshall, it held that the Sullivan standard was applicable because the
statements in question had been made in the course of what was argua-
bly a "labor dispuie." 4 Thus on the same day that the Court in Gertz
restricted the constitutional privilege enunciated in Sullivan to the cate-
gory of public officials and public figures, it also held that the Sullivan
standard was.applicable to persons far less "public" than Mr. Gertz
because of the context in which the alleged defamation had occurred.
The Court gave no indication of whether the Sullivan standard might
apply to statements in other special contexts. 41
Most commentators have classified Old Dominion as a labor case
and ignored its potential for general application. 42 I have elsewhere
argued that this view is mistaken. 43 To confine Old Dominion to labor
disputes is to accept without qualm "a legal resolution under which
speech is freer in the context of a labor dispute than in one of the
paradigmatic first amendment situations-political disputes among pri-
vate citizens." 44 As a matter of logic, not only speech about politics but
also about foreign policy and subjects such as securities regulation and
consumer protection must be given the same protection.
B. Carey v. Brown. 45
In June 1980 the Court struck down an Illinois statute restricting
residential picketing. The statute made it unlawful for a person "'to
picket before or about the residence or dwelling of any person, except
40. 418 U.S. at 282-83.
41. In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied on Linn v. Plant Guard Workers Local 114,
383 U.S. 53 (1966), a case decided before Sullivan had been extended beyond the category of
public officials. In Linn the Court held that defamatory statements made about management
officials during a union organizing campaign, although within the jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board, could also be the subject of an action for damages under state law, pro-
vided that the Sullivan standards were met and that actual damages were shown. State actions for
defamation were thus not totally preempted by federal labor law. The Court in Old Dominion did
not allude to the actual damage requirement ofLi. In Old.Dominion the Court devoted most of
its opinion to the issue of the degree of fault the plaintiffs would have to show. One should note,
however, that the Court went on to hold alternatively that the statements in the newsletter were
not actionable because they involved mere expressions of opinion and the use of epithets. The Old
Dominion case is discussed in greater detail, as is the Supreme Court's treatment of defamation
since Sullivan, in Christie, Injury to Reputation and the Constitution: Confusion 4mid Conflicting
Apfproaches, 75 MICH. L. REv. 43 (1976).
42. For references, see Christie, supra note 41, at 57 n.83. See also Christie, Defamatory
Opinions and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1621, 1624 n.15 (1977).
43. See Christie, supra note 41, at 55-59.
44. Id at 57 n.83.
45. 447 U.S. 455 (1980). Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun, dissented. Id at 472. Justice Stewart wrote a brief concurring opinion. Id at 471.
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when the residence or dwelling is used as a place of business.' "46 The
statute by its express terms, however, did not apply "'to a person
peacefully picketing his own residence or dwelling and [did/ notprohibit
the peaceful picketing of aplace of employment involved in a labor dis-
pute or the place of holding a meeting or assembly on premises com-
monly used to discuss subjects of general public interest.' 47 In Carey
v. Brown the Court upheld a lower court's decision that struck down
the statute because the distinction between labor and non-labor dis-
putes was considered untenable.48
The Court relied heavily on Police Department v. Mosley,49 which
involved an ordinance prohibiting picketing next to a school. The ordi-
nance exempted "the peaceful picketing of any school involved in a
labor dispute."'50 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled
the ordinance unconstitutional and the Court affirmed, stating "[t]he
central problem with Chicago's ordinance is that it describes permissi-
ble picketing in terms of its subject matter. '51 The Court concluded:
above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its sub-ject matter, or its content....
... Selective exclusion from a public forum may not be based
on content alone, and may not be justified by reference to content
alone.5 2
In Carey the appellants sought to distinguish Mosley by arguing
that the government's interest in insuring the privacy of the home is
greater than its interest in preventing disruption at schools, and that the
state has an interest in providing special protection for labor protests-
evidenced by the special concern that federal and state law had long
displayed for such activity.53 The Court did not accept these argu-
ments, declaring unequivocally:
The central difficulty with this argument is that it forthrightly
presupposes that labor picketing is more deserving of First Amend-
ment protection than are public protests over other issues, particu-
larly the important economic, social, and political subjects about
which these appellees wish to demonstrate. We reject that
proposition.54
46. Id at 457 (quoting Act of June 29, 1967, § 1, ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 38, § 21.1-2 (1977)).
47. 447 U.S. at 457 (emphasis added).
48. See Brown v. Scott, 602 F.2d 791 (7th Cir. 1979), aff'dsub nor. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455 (1980).
49. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
50. Id at 93.
51. Id at 95.
52. Id at 95-96.
53. 447 U.S. at 464-67.
54. Id at 466. Though the Court in Carey placed major reliance on Mosley, it also referred
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Admittedly, of course, the Court's record in dealing with situations
in which the content of speech provided the basis for differential treat-
ment has not been totally consistent. One need only refer to Lehman v.
City ofShaker Heights,55 another case decided on the same day as both
Gertz and Old Dominion. In Lehman the Court upheld the refusal of a
public rapid transit system that sold advertising space on the sides of its
vehicles to accept political advertising. One might also note the more
recent Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. ,56 in which the Court up-
held a zoning ordinance restricting the areas in which "adult" motion
picture theatres could be operated,57 and the even more recent FCC v.
Pacfca Foundation,58 in which a sharply divided Court upheld the
FCC's efforts to police radio broadcasters' use of language that is "pa-
tently offensive" but not obscene.5 9
Probably no one could reconcile all the Court's recent activity con-
cerning the regulation of speech according to its content. It is certainly
to Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965). 447 U.S. at 470. In Cox a conviction based on a statute
prohibiting obstruction of public passages was reversed. Although the statutory prohibition ap-
plied to all obstructions other than labor organizations engaged in lawful picketing, the statute
was applied unevenly because the city officials of Baton Rouge, where the obstruction took place,
exercised "unfettered discretion" in issuing permits for certain meetings and parades. 379 U.S. at
553-58. Significantly, the Court commented in a footnote that the statute's exception for labor
picketing, "points up the fact that the statute reaches beyond mere traffic regulation to restrictions
on expression." Id at 556 n. 14. The case also involved a breach of the peace conviction under
another statute struck down as overbroad. In a companion case arising out of the same set of
events and involving a statute restricting picketing on or near a courthouse, the Court upheld the
statute but reversed the conviction because on the facts of the case there was evidence that the
police had advised the appellants that the demonstration would be permitted. Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 559 (1965).
55. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
56. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
57. Cf. New York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, 101 S. Ct. 2599 (1981) (under the 21st
amendment the state has the power to regulate the circumstances under which liquor is sold and,
therefore, may prohibit nude dancing in establishments licensed by the state to serve liquor). But
f Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 101 S. Ct. 2176 (1981) (zoning ordinance prohibiting
live entertainment-in this case nude dancing-in the commercial strip of the borough held
unconstitutional).
58. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
59. The Court not only split five to four but there were important differences among those in
the majority. Justice Stevens, writing the plurality opinion, found that because the speech at issue
was "'vulgar,' 'offensive,' and 'shocking,'" 438 U.S. at 747, it was not entitled to absolute consti-
tutional protection, and that the Court must therefore consider the context in which the speech
was used. Because the case involved radio broadcasting, an area traditionally subject to govern-
ment regulation, Justice Stevens concluded that the FCC acted constitutionally in assessing sanc-
tions against the radio station. Id at 748-50. Justice Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun,
although otherwise concurring in the opinion, could not "subscribe to the view that the Justices of
this Court are free generally to decide on the basis of its content which speech protected by the
First Amendment is most valuable. . . and 'less valuable' .... Id at 761.
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not my purpose to attempt to do so. The complexity of the task would
be increased by the Court's continued erosion of the distinction be-
tween commercial and noncommercial speech.60 My only purpose is
the more limited one of asking how, if states may not insert a special
"labor dispute" exemption in an otherwise presumably valid ban on
picketing in certain locations, can the Court or the Congress insert a
labor dispute exception into what would otherwise be valid state law
restricting defamatory utterances?61
Im. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
It is impossible, given Carey v. Brown, to ignore Old Dominion as
simply a labor dispute case. Carey at least stands for the proposition
that discussion in labor disputes cannot, consistent with the Constitu-
tion, be more free than in other areas of public interest. If private per-
sons alleging defamation in the context of a labor dispute must meet
the Sullivan standard, so must the plaintiffs involved in disputes con-
cerning other matters of public interest. And, as we have seen, a
number of states have so held. 62
Furthermore, Carey also suggests the broader proposition that all
defamation actions must be subject to the same standard of proof of
liability regardless of the context. Anything else is content regulation.
Indeed, there are practical reasons for so holding. Deciding what is a
matter of public interest is a difficult question. Permitting the media to
decide this question presents difficulties, and these problems undoubt-
edly are one reason for the retreat from Rosenbloom. But the idea that
judges are to make this decision for the public also creates difficulties.
One is given little confidence in their judgment when one examines
their efforts at deciding who was a public figure in the Gertz, Firestone,
Hutchinson, and Wolston cases. A good argument can be made that all
of these cases involved public figures.
60. This erosion is reflected in a pair of recent cases, Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980), and Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557 (1980), decided the same day as Carey in June 1980. One might also note John
Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1980), af'dmem., 49 U.S.L.W. 3978 (U.S. July
2, 1981) (No. 80-1597), in which, in late December 1980, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
struck down a Maine statute prohibiting all roadside billboards except those advertising religious
or civic events, election campaign signs, and signs erected by historical and cultural institutions.
See also National Bank v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
61. We are considering, of course, a case where a state has elected, under the Gertz standard,
to require private individuals in defamation actions to show negligence on the part of the defend-
ant. On the issue of content regulation, see Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), cited by
Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion in Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 472 (1980).
62. See note 20 supra.
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The difficulties involved in all these issues suggest the need for a
single standard for all defamation actions-a standard in which the
public figure and the public interest questions play no part. Elsewhere
I have discussed the reasons why I believe the Court will eventually opt
for a universal application of the Gertz negligence standard.
63 My own
personal preference, however, increasingly grows in favor of applying
the Sullivan standard to all defamation actions. This standard provides
maximum protection for freedom of discussion and preserves the plain-
tiff's right to redress when the defendant's conduct is particularly
reprehensible.
63. Christie, supra note 41, at 63-67.
Vol. 1981:811]

